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Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. tI.
McGee: BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE
ABSOLVED OF PERSONAL
UABILITY ABSENT WILLFUL
MISCONDUCT
It was recently held by the United States
Court of Appeals, in Yadkin Valley Bank &
Trust Co. '0. McGee _ F.2d _ (4th Cir.
1987), that a bankruptcy trustee, although
appointed by a federal court, does not have
absolute immunity while adminstering a
bankrupt estate. The court of appeals
reversed the district court's affirmance of
the Bankruptcy Court ruling and has
remanded the case for further factual findings.
On July 15, 1981 John and Ruth Hutchinson filed a voluntary Chapter 7
petition in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina. The debtors owned a dairy farm
and the equipment which was used to
operate the farm. The property had two
mortgages, the first was owned by R.A.
Newman for $62,000.00 and the second
was granted to the plaintiff-appellant,
Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. for
$34,429,08. In addition, the dairy equipment was subject to liens by various
secured creditors totalling $18,000.00.
In September, 1981, two months after
the petition was flled, Bert Holbrook
offered to purchase the property and the
equipment for $135,000.00. This offer was
accepted by the trustee on December 14,
1981 upon the condition that the two
mortgagees accept the offer as well. In the
meantime, lienholders of the dairy equipment began repossession proceedings.
After realizing that some of the equipment
had been taken from the property,
Holbrook
reduced
his
offer
to
$122,000.00. As time passed and before the
sale was consummated, Holbrook's offer
had fallen to $80,000.00. Because value of
the land had fallen below that which
would sufficiently cover the two mortgages, Trustee McGee abandoned the
property pursuant to a court order. The
land was then foreclosed at which time it
was purchased by the second mortgage
holder, Yadkin Valley, for $78,000.00.
The plaintiff-appellant sued McGee for
violating the duties of a trustee. As provid,ed in the United States Code Annotated,
the duties of a trustee include to, "collect
and reduce to money the property of the
estate for which such trustee serves, and
close such estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in
interest." 11 U.S.C.A. S704(1) (Supp.
1987). Yadkin alleged that McGee's conduct in administering the bankrupt estate
was negligent and that the sale of the farm

was not administered expeditiously, nor
was the administration in the best interest
of the parties. The bankruptcy court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that a trustee had
absolute immunity from suit in this case.
The United States District Court affirmed
the lower court decision.
On appeal the United States Court of
Appeals, sought to define the specwc
immunity that a trustee has in bankruptcy.
The issue is clearly reviewable by the court
which held that trustees in bankruptcy do
not hold an absolute immunity to suit.
The court relied on a case previously
decided by it which held that,
[w]hen acting within the discretionary
bounds of his authority, it is settled
that the trustee may not be held liable
for any mistake of judgment; that his
liability personally is "only for acts
determined to be willful and deliberate
in violation of his duties" and specifically that he is liable solely <tin his

official capacity. for acts of negligence. ..
Sherr '0. Winkler. 522 F.2d 1367, 1375
(10th Cir. 19n), relying on Mosser '0.
Darrow. 341 U.S. 267 (1951). (Emphasis added).
McGee, _ F.2d _ (4th Cir. 1987),
(quoting United States '0. Sapp. 641 F .2d
182, 184-185 (4th Cir. 1981).

The facts in Sapp consist of the trustee
giving a post-dated $3,100.00 check from
the bankrupt estate to the plaintiff as restitution for prior months of unpaid lease
payments. Both the trustee and lessor
believed the debtor would be successful in
the future in lieu of the reorganization.
However, the check was returned twice
for insufficient funding and the plaintiff
sued. The court held that the trustee was
not negligent in his conduct, and that at
most he was guilty of a "mere mistake of
judgment." United States '0. Sapp. 641 F.2d
at 184.
In summary, Sapp illustrated that when a
trustee is acting within his authority or
under direct order of the court in continuing a business in bankruptcy, he can not be
held liable as a trustee. By being appointed,
he is provided with certain authority and
vested with a great deal of discretion.
Therefore a mere mistake in judgment will
not result in personal liability against him.
As stated in Sapp, for a trustee to be held
personally liable he must be acting outside
of his authority.
In the case at bar the question was
whether McGee's failure to expedite the
sale of the farm constituted negligence or
a mere mistake of judgment. H it was one
of mistaken judgment, then regardless of

the damages, the trustee would be
immune. To the contrary, if the trustee's
acts were deemed negligent, willful and
deliberate, then immunity would not be
applicable. Thus, becauSe the controversy
centered on questions of fact the United
States Court of Appeals remanded for further findings.
Generally, the bankruptcy laws were
designed to help the debtor or the debtor's
business survive financial crisis. The trustee is appointed to aid in this procedure
and his duties are statutorily defined in the
United States Code Annotated. However,
trustees should be aware that although
appointed by the court, their actions are
not absolutely immune. Although it
appears that a trustee's immunity does
blanket his conduct to a large degree, a
deliberate act outside of a trustees discretion is not protected.

- Lynn R. Jfeagher

For Halifax Packing Co.

tI.

Coyne:

SEVERANCE PAY BENEFITS DO
NOT FLOW FROM ERISA IN
INSTANCES OF PlANT CLOSINGS
In Fort Halifax Packing Co. '0. Cuyne, 107
S.Ct. 2211 (1987), the United States
Supreme Court held that a Maine statute
requiring employers to pay employees severance pay in the event of plant closings
did not "relate to any benefit plan" within
the meaning of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) preemption
provision.
Fort Halifax Packing Company (Fort
Halifax) purchased an existing poultry
packaging and processing plant in 1972 and
operated it for approximately nine years
until its closing in May of 1981 for unspecwed business reasons. The plant had been
operating continuously for nearly thirty
years and its closing left over one hundred
employees out of work. Eleven employees
brought suit in Maine Superior Court
seeking enforcement of Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 26, S625-B (Supp. 1986-1987).
Essentially, the statute provides that any
employer who closes a plant with one hundred or more employees, or relocates a
plant more than one hundred miles away,
must provide one week's severance pay for
each year of employment to all employees
who had worked in the plant at least three
years. The employer is excused from this
provision if the employee accepts employment at the new location or is covered by
a labor contract which deals with the issue
of severance pay.
The Maine Director of the Bureau of
Labor Standards also brought an action to
enforce the statute and, under the terms of
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